not. Their influence was entirely subconscious if not unconscious. Nevertheless they were *Subconscious* at the root of decision, a root which had *prejudices* penetrated too deeply into the soil in which it was planted to be visible even to his own eyes. The arguments used by him were purely strategical. The reasons he gives for preferring an offensive at Verdun rather than the Trentino are published in his book. They are obviously inade-quate to sway the opinions of so clever a man and so capable a soldier. That does not mean that he had not honestly convinced himself that the Verdun offensive would achieve the aim for which it was designed—the destruction in detail of the most power-ful of all the Allied Armies. He was sincerely persuaded that his plan was the best. Had it succeeded it would certainly have been the best. But the chances were against it. These he did not weigh impartially. Where a man is hesitating between two courses, for each of which there is much to be said, his predilections and prejudices weigh in heavily, and

" Where self the wavering balance shakes
'Tis rarely right adjusted."

Where the wider self known as patriotism also comes in, rare indeed (and unpopular) are the men who can preserve an unbiassed judgment. Falkenhayn was as honourable a man as the War threw up in any camp. His patriotism was just as intense as that of Joffre, Nivclle, Foch,

Analogy with Cadorna, Haig and

Robertson, but it *Allied Generals* was no narrower. Why, therefore, should it be assumed that their decisions on questions of military policy were more free from exotic elements than were Falkenhayn's ?